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1 Introduction
Although it is widely acknowledged that serious attempts should be made to reduce envi-
ronmental degradation, there continues to be much reluctance in many countries to adopt
stringent environmental policies. An important reason for this reluctance is the belief that
environmental policies in a country may have a negative impact on the competitiveness of
domestic industries (see, for example, Baumol and Oates, 1988, ch. 16; Simpson and Brad-
ford, 1996). This was apparently one of the reasons why the Bush administration was against
the ratication of the Kyoto agreement. Even in the Netherlands, where the environmental
lobby is powerful, there have been suggestions by the government that exporting sectors
should face less stringent environmental policies than other sectors because of the need to
be competitive in the international market.1
One response to the apparent trade-o¤ between stricter environmental policy and
industrial competitiveness has been to argue that it might not exist, once one allows for
dynamic e¤ects of environmental policy on innovation (Porter and van der Linde, 1995).
However, this proposal remains controversial (see Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw, 1999, for an
assessment). Moreover, a potential solution based on industry-specic exemptions from
environmental taxes, which have been introduced in several European countries, has been
shown not to have the desirable results for either the environment or e¢ ciency (Elkins
and Speck, 1999). The issue therefore remains high on the agenda of policymakers and
international bodies (see, for example, OECD, 2003, 2006 & 2010; UN, 2006 & 2007).
A comprehensive review of theory and evidence on the e¤ects of environmental policy
(OECD, 2006; see also Cebreiro-Gómez, 2006) describes a number of options for alleviating
the impact of environmental taxes on competitiveness, including the recycling of tax revenue
1See, for example, Elbers and Withagen (2003) for a discussion of these issues. A strong case against
preferential treatment for the exporting sectors has been made, among others, by Rauscher (1994, 1997).
Consistent with these fears, empirical work by Babool and Reed (2010) reports a negative relationship
between net exports and environmental regulations in most manufacturing sectors in 10 OECD countries over
the period 1987-2003. A survey of recent evidence on the impact of environmental regulations (Dechezlepretre
and Sato, 2014) nds, on the whole, small negative e¤ects on productivity and employment.
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to the industries a¤ected through output subsidies.2 It is this idea  which has been explored
in the literature  that we shall explore further.3
Before turning to the specic issue at hand, i.e. the e¤ect on environmental policies
on competitiveness, it may be helpful to discuss a related literature which examines the use
of multiple instruments (including production subsidies) in the presence of environmental
externalities. An earlier literature has examined the joint e¤ect of emission taxes and abate-
ment subsidies (for instance, Kohn, 1990; Conrad, 1993). Strand (1998) has analysed the
joint e¤ect of emission taxes and various types of subsidies on employment in a perfectly
competitive industry in the presence of unions. More recently, Fullerton and Wolverton
(1999) have proposed combining output taxes and environmental subsidies in circumstances
where polluting activities are di¢ cult to tax, while Fullerton and Mohr (2003) have shown
that the joint use of output taxes and input or abatement subsidies can increase welfare
more than the use of just one of these instruments. More generally, Bennear and Stavins
(2007) have argued that under a fairly broad set of circumstances the use of multiple policy
instruments is optimal in a second-best world.
Returning to the main issue at hand, Bovenberg, Goulder and Gurney (2005) analyse
the e¢ ciency cost of a scheme whereby tradable emission permits are given free to rms
a¤ected by environmental taxes on the basis of their historical presence in the industry.
They use a model with two competitive vertically-related pollution-generating industries.
Bovenberg, Goulder and Jacobson (2008) extend this framework to alternative environmen-
tal policy instruments other than emission taxes. A number of recent papers analyse the
welfare e¤ects of tax refunding schemes, i.e. the partial or total recycling of environmental
taxes to the rms a¤ected on the basis of market shares, a policy that has been applied to
nitrogen oxide emissions in Sweden (Sterner and Hoglund-Isaksson, 2006). Thus, Gersbach
2A related but di¤erent issue is the so-called double-dividend hypothesisof environmental taxes (see,
for instance, Mooij, 1999, for a survey of an extensive literature), according to which environmental tax
revenues can be recycled to reduce other taxes that create distortions such as income taxes.
3Since output subsidy is actionable under current WTO rules, these schemes would require coordination
between the WTO and the international agencies responsible for coordinating environmental policies. It is
to be noted that discussions have been taking place in WTO for including environmental policies among its
remits.
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and Requate (2004) analyse conditions under which an optimal degree of refunding can be
dened in a Cournot oligopoly. Bernard, Fischer and Fox (2007) examine the welfare impli-
cations of output-based tax refunds in a model with two perfectly competitive sectors, one
of which is unregulated. Fischer (2003) analyses the e¤ect of di¤erent forms of output-based
tax refunds on the incentive to abate in a Cournot duopoly.
Several of these previous studies examine various aspects of policies that combine
environmental taxes with some form of output subsidies in order to compensatethe rms
for their abatement e¤orts. However, the specic schemes do not target competitiveness
of the rms explicitly. Furthermore, only a handful of the papers consider an oligopolistic
framework, and even those papers do not address the question of competitiveness in an
international context.4
In the present paper, we contribute to the existing literature in a number of ways.
First, it is to be noted that although politicians use the word competitiveness pervasively, it
is not clear what exactly they mean by it. In terms of specics, the word competitiveness can
have a number of di¤erent meanings. In this paper, we consider two alternative denitions:
competitiveness as reected on (i) market shares of domestic rms in the international market
place, and (ii) the levels of prots of domestic rms. Second, we consider an international
context with oligopolistic competition between rms, with all the rms within a country being
identical, while heterogeneity exists between domestic and foreign rms. In this context we
examine the e¤ect of environmental and other policies on the relative competitiveness of the
domestic rms vis-a-vis the foreign rms. Third, we allow for cross-border pollution so that
there are two channels for international externalities of policies: via market shares and via
cross-border pollution. Fourth, we derive results both for the case of a unilateral reform,
where a policy is implemented by one country only, and for the case of multilateral reform.
4Following the seminal papers by Spencer and Brander (1983) and Brander and Spencer (1985), there is
also an extensive literature on the strategic use of subsidies to increase international market shares. However,
this literature does not specically address the links between trade and environmental policy. Lapan and
Sikdar (forthcoming) examine the impact of trade on environmental policy but do not discuss the question
of competitiveness. On the other hand, Gautier (forthcoming) analyses environmental policy options for
countries aiming to attract foreign investment, which may be seen as a policy aim linked to competitiveness.
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Fifth, we examine the e¤ect of the proposed reforms on government tax revenue. Sixth,
while our basic model assumes free entry and exit of rms in both countries, we check the
robustness of our results for the case of a xed number of rms. It is for this case that we
can apply and compare the two alternative denitions of competitiveness described above
 denition (ii) cannot be applied in the case of free entry and exit of rms because prots
are then always equal to zero. Finally, we do not examine optimality of policies, rather
we analyze the environmental and welfare implications of particular schemes for piecemeal
unilateral or multilateral reform of environmental taxes and output subsidies that leave
the market shares or prots of the two sets of rms unchanged.5 The choice to focus on
piecemeal reform can be justied on empirical grounds: most multilateral policy initiatives
such as successive GATT/WTO rounds for trade policy reforms, or the Kyoto and Paris
protocols for environmental policy reforms, involved small incremental moves towards an
ideal world. Because of this, there is a now a large theoretical literature on piecemeal
reforms of policies.6 We carry out our analysis by developing a general two-country model
of an oligopolistic industry serving an integrated market, where the rms make their output
and emission decisions simultaneously. We show that the schemes we propose unambiguously
reduce the level of pollution, and we also derive conditions under which they increase welfare
in both countries.
2 The Model
There are two countries, a and b, with na and nb rms, respectively. In this section we
describe the basic structure of our model taking na and nb as given. In section 3 we shall
consider policy reforms under free entry and exit of rms, so that na and nb are endogenous.
Then in the following section we shall examine the e¤ects of reforms when na and nb are
xed. All rms within a country produce a homogeneous product, but there is product
5Lahiri and Symeonidis (2007) examined the e¤ects of multilateral reforms of environmental taxes without
any considerations for competitiveness. For alternative approaches to multilateral reform of environmental
taxes, see Michael, Lahiri and Hatzipanayotou (2015) and dAutume, Schubert and Withagen (2016).
6See footnote 3 in Michael, Lahiri and Hatzipanayotou (2015) for some of the papers in this literature.
4
di¤erentiation across countries.7 Inverse demand functions in the two countries are given,
respectively, by
pa = fa(xa1 +   + xana ; xb1 +   + xbnb); (1)
pb = f b(xa1 +   + xana ; xb1 +   + xbnb); (2)
where xji is the output of rm i in country j. The prot functions are given by
ji = p
jxji   cji (xji ; eji )  tjeji + sjxji   F ji ; j = a; b; i = 1;    ; nj: (3)
where cji (x
j
i ; e
j
i ) is the total cost of rm i in country j, e
j
i the level of emissions of rm i
in country j, tj the per unit emission tax in country j, sj the per unit output subsidy in
country j, and F ji the xed cost of production for rm i in countryj. Total cost is the sum
of production and abatement costs.8
All rms simultaneously choose a level of output and a level of emissions. In particular,
rm i in country a chooses a level of output to maximize its prot treating the output of
other rms as given. This yields the following rst-order condition
@ai
@xai
= fa1 x
a
i + f
a   cai1 + sa = 0; i = 1;    ; na; (4)
while rm i in country b chooses a level of output treating all other outputs as given according
to the rst-order condition
@bi
@xbi
= f b2x
b
i + f
b   cbi1 + sb = 0; i = 1;    ; nb; (5)
wheref jk and c
j
ik are the partial derivatives of f
j and cji , respectively, with respect to the kth
argument, j = a; b and k = 1; 2.
In addition, rm i in country j chooses a level of emissions according to
@ji
@eji
=  cji2   tj = 0; j = a; b; i = 1;    ; nj: (6)
7The consideration of di¤erentiated products will enable us to consider the case of free entry and exit of
rms in both countries in a meaningful way (see also footnote 9).
8The absolute value of the partial derivative of this cost function with respect to the second argument is
the marginal cost of abatement.
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In deriving the above condition, we assumed away the possibility of corner solutions.
To ensure tractability of our model we will assume symmetry within each country.
Assuming that all rms within each country have similar technology is not unrealistic if one
thinks of this technology as being determined partly in response to country-specic past
policies. Suppressing the rm-specic subscripts, equations (4)-(6) can be rewritten as
fa1 (n
axa; nbxb)xa + fa(naxa; nbxb)  ca1(xa; ea) + sa = 0; (7)
f b2(n
axa; nbxb)xb + f b(naxa; nbxb)  cb1(xb; eb) + sb = 0; (8)
  cj2(xj; ej)  tj = 0; j = a; b: (9)
These four equations implicitly determine the equilibrium values of xa, xb, ea and eb. We
make the following assumptions:
Assumption 1 (i) cj1 > 0; c
j
2 < 0, (ii) c
j
11 > 0, c
j
22 > 0, c
j
11c
j
22   (cj12)2 > 0, (iii) cj12 < 0
(j = a; b), (iv) f ji < 0; (i = 1; 2; j = a; b), (v) Y
jf jik(Y
a; Y b) + f jl (Y
a; Y b) < 0 for any
j = a; b; i; k; l = 1; 2:
The rst part of the assumption states that the cost functions are increasing in output
and decreasing in emission levels, the second part that they are convex, and the third that
output and emission are complements in the sense that an increase in emission reduces the
marginal cost of production. The fourth part says that demand functions are downward
sloping. The fth part, which is a very common assumption in the theory of Cournot
oligopolistic behavior (see, for example, Dixit, 1986; Shapiro, 1989; Farrell and Shapiro,
1990), has a number of implications. First, it implies strategic substitutability and it is
always true whenever Xjf jik(Y
a; Y b) + f jl (Y
a; Y b) < 0 for any 0  Xj  Y j. It also implies
all the properties required by the di¤erent Propositions of the paper. It is to be noted that
Amir (1996, Theorems 2.1 and 2.3) has proved the existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
under weaker conditions than ours.
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Having described the basic framework of our model, we shall now consider the im-
plications of unilateral or multilateral policy reforms under two scenarios: (i) there is free
entry and exit of rms in both countries (section 3), and (ii) the numbers of rms in both
countries are xed (section 4).
3 Policy reform under free entry and exit of rms
In this section we shall assume that there is free entry and exit of rms in both countries
so that na and nb are both endogenous.9 The sequential structure we have in mind is as
follows. First, the government(s) set(s) policies. Then the number of rms is determined.
Finally, all rms simultaneously make output and emission decisions.
Free entry and exit implies that prots of each rm in both countries are always zero.
That is, assuming symmetry within each group of rms, from (3) we write
j = pjxj   cj(xj; ej)  tjej + sjxj   F j = 0; j = a; b: (10)
Note that the zero prot condition implies that the only denition of competitiveness
we can use in this section is the one that relates to market shares of rms.
Di¤erentiating (10) and using (7), (8) and (9), we obtain
fa1 x
adxa = fa1 x
ad(naxa) + xafa2 d(n
bxb)  eadta + xadsa; (11)
f b2x
bdxb = f b1x
bd(naxa) + xbf b2d(n
bxb)  ebdtb + xbdsb: (12)
From (11) and (12) we see that, for given levels of demands (naxa and nbxb), an
increase in emission tax ti, or a decrease in production subsidy si, surprisingly increases the
output level xi (i = a; b). This happens because of free entry and exit of rms. An increase
in ti, or a decrease in si, reduces the prot of each rm inducing exit of rms and thus
9We are able to determine both na and nb endogenously because we consider a di¤erentiated oligopoly.
If the goods produced by the two countries were perfect substitutes, under free entry and exit one group of
rms (the less e¢ cient ones) would disappear.
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increasing the output of each of the rms that remain. This process goes on until a new zero
prot equilibrium is achieved.
Totally di¤erentiating (9), we get
ca22de
a =  dta   ca21dxa; (13)
cb22de
b =  dtb   cb21dxb: (14)
An increase in tax in a country reduces emissions by rms in that country, for a given
level of output, and an increase in output increases emissions.
Totally di¤erentiating (7) and (8) and then substituting (7), (8), (9), (11) and (12)
into the expressions derived, we obtain
2fa1 + x
afa11  
a
ca22

d(naxa) +

fa2 + x
afa12  
afa2
ca22f
a
1

d(nbxb) =

 2 + 
a
fa1 c
a
22

dsa +

 c
a
12
ca22
  
aea
ca22x
afa1
+
ea
xa

dta; (15)

f b1 + x
bf b21  
bf b1
cb22f
b
2

d(naxa) +

2f b2 + x
bf b22  
b
cb22

d(nbxb) =

 2 + 
b
f b2c
b
22

dsb +

 c
b
12
cb22
  
beb
cb22x
bf b2
+
eb
xb

dtb; (16)
where a = ca11c
a
22   (ca12)2 > 0 and b = cb11cb22   (cb12)2 > 0.
Having derived the basic equations, we shall now consider a unilateral or multilateral
reform and examine its e¤ect on the level of pollution, tax revenue and welfare. We propose
a reform involving changes in tax rates dtj and in subsidies dsj (j = a; b) such that
 2 + 
a
fa1 c
a
22

dsa =  

 c
a
12
ca22
  
aea
ca22x
afa1
+
ea
xa

dta; (17)

 2 + 
b
f b2c
b
22

dsb =  

 c
b
12
cb22
  
beb
cb22x
bf b2
+
eb
xb

dtb: (18)
This includes the case where one of the countries, say country a, sets dta = dsa = 0. Given
Assumption ??, it should be clear that in the above reform an increase in tj should be
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accompanied by an increase in sj (j = a; b). Note that we are considering a small change
in the tax and subsidy rates, starting from the initial equilibrium, and the informational
requirements for the implementation of the reforms (17) and (18) are that each country
knows the values of outputs, emissions etc. at the initial equilibrium, and also that the
countries know the functional forms of the demand and cost functions in their own countries.
From (15)-(18) it follows that this reform will leave the equilibrium values of njxj
(j = a; b) unchanged. That is, the reform will leave the market shares of the two countries,
and the prices of the two goods, una¤ected. Using this, from (11) and (12) we obtain
fa1 x
adxa =  eadta + xadsa; f b2xbdxb =  ebdtb + xbdsb: (19)
Substituting (17) and (18) in (19), we get
fa1 x
a

2  
a
fa1 c
a
22

dxa =  c
a
22e
a + ca21x
a
ca22
 dta; (20)
f b2x
b

2  
b
f b2c
b
22

dxb =  c
b
22e
b + cb21x
b
cb22
dtb: (21)
Since d(nixi) = 0, the e¤ect on the number of rms will be just of the opposite sign of that
on the output levels.
Although our proposed reform (17) and (18) leaves total outputs in each country
unchanged, it does a¤ect the output level of each rm and the number of rms in each
country. Our reform has two components: an increase in emission tax and a corresponding
increase in production subsidy. The former reduces the output of each rm, but the latter
raises it. The e¤ect of the reform on the output of each rm is therefore in general ambiguous,
as can be seen from (20) and (21). However, if the cost functions are homogeneous of degree
k > 1, then using Eulers theorem and (6), we can write ci22e
i+ci21x
i = (k 1)ci2 =  (k 1)ti <
0 (i = a; b). Therefore an increase in emission tax (with a corresponding increase in output
subsidy as per the reform) in a country will reduce the output of each rm, and increase
the number of rms, in that country. Importantly, with our reform there will be no scal
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externality across the countries, i.e. emission tax and production subsidy increases in one
country will not a¤ect output, emissions or the number of rms in the other country. This
follows from (13), (14), (20) and (21). The absence of international scal externality is a
result of a key property of our reform, namely that the reform in one country does not a¤ect
aggregate outputs in the two countries and therefore the inverse demand facing each rm in
the other country is not a¤ected either.
Since the e¤ect of the reform on the output of each rm is in general ambiguous, it
follows from (13) and (14) that the e¤ect on emissions by each rm will also be ambiguous.
However, if the cost functions are homogeneous of degree greater than unity, then the reform
will unambiguously reduce emissions by each rm because output is also reduced, as shown
above. These results are formally stated in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Under free entry and exit of rms, a piecemeal reform of policies such that dti > 0
and dsi > 0 (i = a; b) satisfying (17) and (18), has the following e¤ects:
 The policy reform in one country does not a¤ect each rms level of output and emis-
sion, and the number of rms, in the other country.
 The e¤ect of the reform in one country on each rms level of output and emission,
and the number of rms, in the same country is in general ambiguous. However, if
the cost functions are homogeneous of degree greater than unity, each rms output
and emission in the same country unambiguously decrease, and the number of rms
increases. 
We now turn our attention to the e¤ect of the reform on aggregate emission levels.
Since d(njxj) = 0, we have
d(njej) = njdej + ejdnj = njdej   n
jej
xj
 dxj:
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Substituting (13), (14), (11), (12), (17) and (18) in the above equation, we get
2 a=(fa1 ca22)
na
 d(n
aea)
dta
=  2 
a=(fa1 c
a
22)
ca22
+
1
fa1


ca21
ca22
+
ea
xa
2
< 0; (22)
2 b=(f b2cb22)
nb
 d(n
beb)
dtb
=  2 
b=(f b2c
b
22)
ca22
+
1
f b2


cb21
cb22
+
eb
xb
2
< 0; (23)
and tax in one country will have no e¤ect on total emissions by rms in the other country.
That is, a unilateral reform in country a, say, satisfying dta > 0, dsa > 0 and (17)
unambiguously reduces total emissions by rms in country a, and has no e¤ect on total
emissions by rms in country b. A multilateral reform satisfying dta > 0, dsa > 0, dtb > 0,
dsb > 0, and (17) and (18) will unambiguously reduce aggregate emissions in both countries.
Intuitively, emission taxes reduce pollution, while output subsidies increase it, and the net
e¤ect is negative for our specic reform rule which is designed to keep the market shares of
the two countries una¤ected. These results are formally stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under free entry and exit of rms, the e¤ect of our proposed reform on
emissions will be as follows:
 A unilateral piecemeal reform in one of the countries, say country a, satisfying dta > 0,
dsa > 0 and (17) will unambiguously reduce total emissions by rms in that country,
and will have no e¤ect on total emissions by rms in the other country.
 A multilateral piecemeal reform satisfying dta > 0, dsa > 0, dtb > 0, dsb > 0, and (17)
and (18) will unambiguously reduce aggregate emissions in both countries. 
Turning to welfare, since prots are zero and prices do not change, it has two com-
ponents: tax revenue and disutility from pollution. That is, W j = tjnjej   sjnjxj  
j(njej + jnkek), where j denotes the disutility from pollution and j is the spillover
parameter describing the extent of cross-border pollution into country j from country k
(j = a; b; k 6= j = a; b). We assume j0 > 0, i.e. the disutility from pollution is increasing
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in the level of pollution. Totally di¤erentiating this expression for welfare, and using (17),
(18) and the fact that d(njxj) = 0, we nd
dW j = tjd(njej) + (njej)dtj   (njxj)dsj   j0d(njej)  jj0d(nkek);
and thus
dW a = ta  @(n
aea)
@ta
dta +
na
2 a=(ca22fa1 )


ea +
xaca12
ca22

dta
 a0  @(n
aea)
@ta
dta   aa0  @(n
beb)
@tb
dtb; (24)
dW b = tb  @(n
beb)
@tb
dtb +
nb
2 b=(cb22f b2)


eb +
xbcb12
cb22

dtb
 b0  @(n
beb)
@tb
dtb   bb0  @(n
aea)
@ta
dta: (25)
The rst two terms on the right-hand sides of (24) and (25) are the changes in tax
revenue and the last two terms are the changes in the disutility from pollution in the two
countries. Since pollution levels go down with our reform, the last two terms are positive
(or one of them is zero, in the case of unilateral reform), and the rst terms negative.
The middle terms are in general ambiguous, but if the cost functions are homogeneous of
degree k > 1, from the discussion after (21) we know that these terms are negative, so
tari¤ revenue unambiguously falls. Another situation where tari¤ revenue unambiguously
falls is when the cost functions take the form cj(xj; ej) = ~cj(xj) + (jxj   ej)2=2, which
represents the case of end-of-the-pipe type of abatement. It is then easy to verify that
ej + xacj12=c
j
22 =  (jxi   ej) < 0; j = a; b, that is, tari¤ revenue decreases. In other words,
the reform will increase welfare if the marginal disutilities from pollution are su¢ ciently
high.
When the reform is unilateral and only takes place in country a, we get from (24) and
12
(25)
dW a = ta  @(n
aea)
@ta
dta +
na
2 a=(ca22fa1 )


ea +
xaca12
ca22

dta   a0  @(n
aea)
@ta
dta;
dW b =  bb0  @(n
aea)
@ta
dta:
In this case, country b unambiguously benets from the reform, but country a benets if the
marginal disutility from pollution in that country is su¢ ciently high. Therefore:
Proposition 2 Under free entry and exit of rms, a multilateral piecemeal reform of emis-
sion taxes and output subsidies designed to leave the market shares of countries unchanged
according to (17) and (18) will increase welfare in both countries provided the marginal
disutilities from pollution are su¢ ciently high. A unilateral policy reform according to (17)
will increase welfare in the country implementing the policy if the marginal disutility from
pollution is su¢ ciently high in that country, and will always increase welfare in the other
country.
We also show in the Appendix that in the special case of linear demand and end-of-
the-pipe type of abatement, the change in tax revenue is negligible when tj ' 0. It follows
that if the initial tax rate is tj ' 0, the welfare of the country or countries implementing the
reform will always rise.
4 The case of xed number of rms
In this section we shall assume that both na and nb are exogenously given and therefore
equations (10) do not apply. Totally di¤erentiating (7) and (8) and using (13) and (14) we
obtain
a11dx
a + a12dx
b = adta   dsa; (26)
b21dx
a + b22dx
b = bdtb   dsb; (27)
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where a11 = n
axafa11 + (n
a + 1)fa1  a=ca22 < 0;
b22 = n
bxbf b22 + (n
b + 1)f b2  b=cb22 < 0;
a12 = n
b(xafa12 + f
a
2 ) < 0; 
b
21 = n
a(xbf b21 + f
b
1) < 0;
a =  ca12=ca22 > 0; b =  cb12=cb22 > 0;
a = ca11c
a
22   (ca12)2 > 0; b = cb11cb22   (cb12)2 > 0;
because of Assumption 1.
The parameters a and b can be called the pollution intensity of technology in
countries a and b respectively. Note that j gives the marginal emission of production for a
given level of marginal cost of abatement.10
Solving (26) and (27) simultaneously for dxa and dxb, we obtain
 dxa = b22(
a dta   dsa)  a12(b dtb   dsb); (28)
 dxb = a11(
b dtb   dsb)  b21(a dta   dsa); (29)
where  = a11
b
22   a12b21 > 0:
As one would expect, an increase in emission tax (production subsidy) in a country
reduces (increases) the output of the rms in that country and increases (reduces) those in
the other country.
This completes the preliminary analysis of our model for the case of xed numbers of
rms, and we shall now consider two alternative denitions of competitiveness and examine
the implications of unilateral and multilateral environmental policy reforms. These are taken
up in turn in the following two subsections.
10dcj2 = c
j
21dx
j + cj22de
j . Thus, j = (dej=dxj)jdcj2=0. For the special case of end-of-the-pipe type of
abatement, the cost function can be written as cj = ~cj(xj) + (jxj   ej), where the rst part is the
production cost function and the second part is the abatement cost function, j being the gross pollution
rate. It can be veried that for this cost function j = j .
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4.1 Competitiveness as Market Share
In this subsection we shall consider a unilateral or multilateral reform which will reduce emis-
sions and increase welfare but keep the international market shares of all rms unchanged.
If dsj is chosen such that
dsj = j dtj; (30)
it follows from (28) and (29) that dxa = dxb = 0. That is, under the rule (30), the output
levels will not change  a result which holds in the case of reform by one country only (so that
ds = dt = 0 in the other country) or by both countries. However, the important di¤erence
under the reform is that the level of emissions in country j will be lower if dtj > 0. To be
specic, the change in emissions is obtained from (13) and (14) after setting dxa = dxb = 0.
Since cj22 > 0, emissions in country j will decrease if dt
j > 0.
We shall now examine under what conditions a higher welfare level can be achieved by
an increase in emission tax and a simultaneous introduction (or increase) of output subsidy
such that (30) holds. First, note that since output levels will not change, prices and the
consumerssurplus in each country will not be a¤ected by the policy. As for prots, using
(7)-(9), it is easy to check that the change in the prot of each rm is given by
dj =  ejdtj + xjdsj; j = a; b; (31)
which, using (30), becomes
dj = ej

 1 + x
jj
ej

dtj:
Since j = (dej=dxj)jdcj2=0 (see footnote 10), the above expression can be rewritten as
dj = ej
 1 + j dtj; (32)
where j = (xj=ej) (dej=dxj)jdcj2=0 is the emission elasticity of production along the iso-
marginal abatement cost curve. Clearly, our reform scheme (with dtj > 0) given in (30) will
increase prots if and only if j > 1.
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The net tax revenue of the government, T j, can be obtained as
T j = tjnjej   sjnjxj: (33)
Dening the level of welfare in a country as the sum of prots, consumerssurplus
and net tax revenue, minus the disutility from the pollution generated in that country or
transmitted across the border from the other country, we can describe the welfare levels W j
as
W j = njj + CSj + T j   j(njej + nkek); j = a; b; k 6= j: (34)
As in the previous section, the function j denotes the disutility of total pollution experienced
by country j, and  is the spillover parameter describing the extent of cross-border pollution.
We assume again j0 > 0.
Totally di¤erentiating (34), using (6), (13), (14), (30), (31) and (33), and setting
dCSj = 0, we obtain
dW j =  njtjdtj=cj22 + j0njdtj=cj22 + j0nkdtk=ck22: (35)
Equation (35) can be explained intuitively as follows. Since the policy reform of
dtj > 0 and dsj > 0 satisfying (30) does not a¤ect output levels, it has no e¤ect on consumers
surplus. The sum of total prots and tax revenue is equal to the total revenue of the rms
net of production and abatement costs. As the output levels do not change, the total revenue
of the rms will not change either. But total costs will increase because of an increase in
abatement levels needed to reduce emissions. This negative e¤ect on welfare is given by the
rst term in (35). On the other hand, since the reform reduces emission levels, it reduces
disutility from pollution and thus increases welfare. The second term reects the positive
e¤ect on welfare via a decrease in domestic pollution, and the third term gives the positive
e¤ect on welfare via a reduction in cross-border pollution for the case where the reform is
implemented by both countries.
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From (35), it should be clear that if the initial levels of emission tax are low and/or
the marginal utility of pollution reduction is high, it is possible to increase the tax rates in
such a way that not only emissions are reduced, but also welfare increases in both countries.
For instance, if, say, dta = dtb = dt > 0, we nd
dW j > 0() tj < j0[1 + (nk=nj)(cj22=ck22)]: (36)
That is, if condition (36) is satised, each country will be better o¤by an agreement to
increase emission taxes by a common amount and at the same time provide output subsidies
according to the formula (30). Since tj =  cj2 (see (9)), a su¢ cient condition for the
multilateral reform to increase welfare is that  cj2  0, i.e. that the marginal private cost of
abatement is smaller than the marginal social benet of abatement. If the initial tax rates
in the two countries are at the Pigouvian optimal levels, i.e.  cj2 = 0, the reform scheme
given in (30) will unambiguously increase welfare in both countries.
Alternatively, for the case of a unilateral policy, that is dta > 0 and dtb = 0, we have
dW a =  natadta=ca22 + a0nadta=ca22; (37)
dW b = b0nadta=ca22: (38)
In this case the country that is increasing the environmental tax and the output
subsidy will have higher welfare if tj < j0, while the other country will always be better
o¤. Thus, if the initial tax rate of the country implementing the policy is lower than the the
marginal social benet of abatement, a unilateral policy will increase welfare in the country
implementing it.
We can summarize the above results as follows:
Proposition 3 When the number of rms is xed in the two countries, a unilateral or
multilateral piecemeal reform of emission taxes and output subsidies designed to leave the
market shares of countries unchanged under the rule (30) will have the following e¤ects:
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 It will unambiguously reduce pollution.
 It will increase welfare under certain conditions. In particular, under a multilateral
policy, welfare will increase if the initial levels of emission tax are low and/or the
marginal utility of pollution reduction is high. With a unilateral policy, welfare will
increase in the country implementing the policy if the initial tax rate is lower than
the marginal social benet of abatement and will always increase welfare in the other
country.
Finally, we examine the e¤ect of the proposed policy reform on government tax rev-
enue. This is di¢ cult to examine for a general cost function, so we focus on the spe-
cial case of end-of-the-pipe type of abatement, where the cost function can be written as
cj = ~cj(xj) + (jxj   ej) , with j being the gross pollution rate. It can be veried that
for this cost function j = j. We also assume the abatement cost to be quadratic, so that
equation (6) becomes jxj   ej = tj; j = a; b. For simplicity, we shall only consider a
unilateral reform in country a, i.e., dta > 0, dsa > 0, and dtb = dsb = 0. The change in net
revenue is then given by
dT a = na(tadea + eadta)  na(sadxa + xadsa):
Setting dxa = 0 and using (6), (30) and a = a, we obtain dT a =  2natadta:Therefore
if the initial tax rate ta ' 0, the policy reform will have negligible e¤ect on tax revenue.
However, if ta >> 0, then the reform will reduce tax revenue.
4.2 Competitiveness as Prots
The scheme proposed in the previous subsection ensures that the rmsmarket shares remain
unchanged, while emissions unambiguously decrease and welfare increases under certain
(plausible) conditions, in both countries. A possible objection to this scheme is that it may
cause rmsprots to either rise or fall (see (32)). A fall in prots may be seen as a loss
18
of competitiveness under an alternative denition of the term unless rms receive lump-
sum transfers from the government.11 In this section we consider unilateral and multilateral
reforms of environmental policy that will leave rmsprots (rather than their market shares)
constant.12
To keep the analysis short, we examine a special case of the model. In particular, the
demand functions are assumed to be linear, while the cost functions are quadratic and take
a specic form where abatement is of the end-of-the-pipe type and thus total costs can be
separated into production and abatement costs. However, the intuition for our results can
be applied to the general case, as we discuss below.
Once again there are two countries, a and b, with na and nb rms, respectively. All
rms within a country produce a homogeneous product, but there is product di¤erentiation
across countries. The inverse demand functions are given by
pa = 1  naxa   nbxb (39)
pb = 1  nbxb   naxa;  2 (0; 1]; (40)
where pi and xi are respectively the price and output of each rm of the good produced in
country i, and  is an inverse measure of the degree of product di¤erentiation.
We now introduce policy interventions. Denoting emission tax and production subsidy
imposed by country i by ti and si, respectively, the prot of the rm in country i is given by
i = (pi   ci)xi   (
ixi   ei)2
2
  tiei + sixi; i = 1; 2; (41)
where i is the gross emission of pollution per unit of output before any abatement is carried
out, and ei is the net emission level. In the above formulation, it is assumed that the total
abatement cost of the rm is (ixi ei)2=2. It should be noted that by assuming separability
11If the reform increases welfare levels, then it is potentially strictly Pareto improving if lump-sum transfers
are possible. However, in reality lump-sum transfers are di¢ cult to implement.
12This particular reform is not meaningful under free entry and exit of rms as prots there do not exist.
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between production and abatement costs, we are e¤ectively assuming abatement is of the
end-of-the-pipe type.13
When the rms make their output and emission decisions simultaneously, the rst-
order prot-maximizing conditions for output and emission level for rm i are given, respec-
tively, by
@i
@xi
= pi   ci   xi   i(ixi   ei) + si = 0; i = 1; 2; (42)
@i
@ei
= ixi   ei   ti = 0; i = 1; 2: (43)
Solving (42) and (43), substituting xi and ei into the prot function and simplifying,
we obtain
i = (xi)2 +
(ti)2
2
; (44)
and therefore
di = 0 =) 2xidxi =  tidti; i = 1; 2: (45)
Using (43) and (45) we get
dei = idxi   dti =  

1 +
iti
2xi

dti:
It follows that
dti > 0 () dei < 0;
irrespective of whether the reform is unilateral or multilateral.
Next we analyze the e¤ect of the proposed policy reform on government tax revenue
for the current special case. For simplicity, we shall only consider a unilateral reform in
country a, i.e. dta > 0, dsa > 0 and dtb = dsb = 0. Using (39), (40), (42) and (43), the
13Important examples of end-of-pipe abatement include catalytic converters in cars, scrubbers on smoke-
stacks and various technologies for the treatment of industrial waste water and municipal solid waste. Ac-
cording to an OECD report (OECD, 1989), in 1987 around 80 per cent of total investment in pollution
control was being used for end-of-pipe technologies, although there is some evidence that this percentage has
declined somewhat in several OECD countries during the 1990s.
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closed-form solution for xa is solved as
[(na + 1)(nb + 1)  2nanb)]xa = (nb + 1)(1  ca   ata+ sa)  nb(1  cb   btb + sb);
which gives
[(na + 1)(nb + 1)  2nanb)]dxa =  (nb + 1)(adta   dsa): (46)
Taking the derivative of (33) in the present case and using (43), (45) and (46), we get
dT a
dta
=
d((na(taea   saxa))
dta
=  t
ana[3  na + 3nb   (1  2)nanb]
2(nb + 1)
+
tana(sa   ata)
2xa
:
From the above, it follows that if the initial tax rate ta ' 0, the reform will have negligible
e¤ect on tax revenue. However, if ta >> 0, then the reform can increase or reduce tax
revenue.
The overall e¤ect of environmental policy on welfare when prots are kept constant
consists of three separate e¤ects: on consumer surplus, net tax revenue and emissions. Using
(42), (43), (45) and (46), it can be shown that
(nb + 1)dpa =  naf(nb + 1)  2nbgdxa:
Thus, using (45), it is seen that the reform will reduce pa. It can also been shown that pb will
not change, and hence consumer surplus will unambiguously increase. The e¤ect on net tax
revenue, as shown above, is potentially ambiguous. However, since an increase in emission
tax reduces emissions when prots are kept constant, welfare will increase provided i is
su¢ ciently large, that is, if consumers care su¢ ciently about reductions in emission levels.14
Note that this result holds also for the general model used in the previous subsection. Note
also that a high value of i is a su¢ cient but not necessary condition for an increase in
welfare; for instance, the higher the value of nb relative to na and of sa relative to ata, the
greater the likelihood of a positive e¤ect of the reform on net tax revenue and therefore on
overall welfare.
We now collect the main results of this subsection in the following proposition.
14Note that Dechezlepretre and Sato (2014) found that the benets of an environmental policy are likely
to far outweigh the costs even in the absence of a compensating production subsidy.
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Proposition 4 When the number of rms is xed in the two countries, and for a special
case of the model featuring linear demand functions and quadratic cost functions where abate-
ment is of the end-of-the-pipe type, a unilateral or multilateral piecemeal reform of emission
taxes and output subsidies designed to keep the rmsprots in the two countries unchanged
according to the rule (45)will have the following e¤ects:
 It will unambiguously reduce pollution.
 It will increase welfare if consumers care su¢ ciently about reductions in pollution.
5 Conclusion
The perceived negative impact of environmental policies on domestic industrial competitive-
ness is often the reason why countries are reluctant to implement stringent environmental
regulations. In this paper we have shown that if environmental regulations are accompanied
by production subsidies in a particular way, then domestic industries will not be harmed in
terms of their relative international competitiveness and at the same time pollution will be
reduced and welfare could increase, in all countries.
More specically, we have examined three di¤erent scenarios. We began with the
case of free entry and exit of rms, using a fairly general model with general demand and
cost functions. We established that in this case a unilateral or multilateral piecemeal policy
reform designed to leave the market shares of countries unchanged will unambiguously reduce
pollution. Furthermore, a multilateral policy will increase welfare in both countries provided
the marginal disutilities from pollution are su¢ ciently high. A unilateral policy will increase
welfare in the country implementing the policy if the marginal disutility from pollution is
su¢ ciently high in that country, and will always increase welfare in the other country.
We then considered the case of an exogenously given xed number of rms in each
country. Again we showed that a unilateral or multilateral policy designed to leave the
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market shares of countries unchanged will unambiguously reduce pollution, and will increase
welfare under certain conditions. Under a multilateral policy, welfare will increase if the
initial levels of emission tax are low and/or the marginal utility of pollution reduction is
high. With a unilateral policy, welfare will increase in the country implementing the policy
if the initial tax rate is lower than the marginal social benet of abatement, and will always
increase in the other country.
Finally, while maintaining our assumption of a xed number of rms in each country,
we explored an alternative reform, designed to keep the prots (rather than the market
shares) of the two countries unchanged. For a special case of our model we showed that such
a unilateral or multilateral policy of emission taxes and output subsidies will unambiguously
reduce pollution, and once again will increase welfare if consumers care su¢ ciently about
reductions in pollution. The intuition for these results can be applied to the general model
as well. All in all, we have described a number of environmental policy reforms such that
their implementations are simple and do not involve any trade-o¤ between environmental
protection and industrial competitiveness.
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Appendix
To provide additional results and intuition for the case of free entry and exit of rms, we
consider here a special case of the model. In particular, we shall make all the simplifying
assumptions on preferences and technologies made in subsection 4.2. That is, equations (39)
and (40) will hold, and prots are given by
i = (pi   ci)xi   (
ixi   ei)2
2
  tiei + sixi   F i; i = 1; 2: (A.1)
The existence of xed costs will not a¤ect the rst-order prot maximizing conditions so
that equations (42) and (43) will hold. Substituting these in (A.1), we can write the free
entry conditions as
i =
 
xi
2
+
(ti)
2
2
  F i = 0; i = 1; 2; (A.2)
whence for i = 1; 2, we get
xi =
s
F i   (t
i)2
2
; (A.3)
ei = ixi   ti = i
s
F i   (t
i)2
2
  ti; (A.4)
dxi =   t
i
2xi
 dti; (A.5)
dei = idxi   dti =  

1 +
iti
2xi

dti: (A.6)
Substituting (39), (40) and (43) in (42) and then di¤erentiating it and using (43) and (A.5),
we obtain
d(naxa) + d(nbxb) =  adta + dsa; (A.7)
d(naxa) + d(nbxb) =  bdtb + dsb; (A.8)
where
i =
1
2

ei
xi
+ i

; i = 1; 2:
28
If we now consider a unilateral or multilateral policy reform (dta > 0; dtb  0) such that
idti = dsi, it is clear from (A.7) and (A.8) that we shall have d(nixi) = 0 for i = 1; 2. Thus,
the reform will leave the market share of the two countries unchanged.
Turning to the e¤ect of the reform on the level of pollution, since nidxi =  xidni, using
(43), (A.5) and (A.6), we nd that
d(niei)
dti
=  ni   n
i (ti)
2
2 (xi)2
< 0; i = 1; 2: (A.9)
That is, the reform will reduce pollution unambiguously.
Finally, since the reform does not change total outputs by the two sets of rms, the prices
will not change and so the consumerssurplus will remain unchanged. Tax revenue T i is
given by T i = nitiei   nisixi. Di¤erentiating this expression for tax revenue and using the
reform rule, (43), and (A.9), we nd
1
ni
 dT
i
dti
=  t
i
2
"
3 +

ti
xi
2#
;
which is negative for ti > 0, but is negligible when ti ' 0.
Thus, we nd that one component of welfare (tax revenue) goes down with the reform,
another component goes up (since the disutility from pollution decreases), and the other
components (consumersand producerssurplus) remain unchanged. Clearly, the net e¤ect
will depend on the societys willingness to pay for lower pollution. If the initial tax rate
ta ' 0, the welfare of the country or countries implementing the reform will rise.
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